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Abstract
Despite its lack of attractiveness to other countries, the German system of quasi-parity 
codetermination at company level has held up remarkably well. We recount the theoretical 
arguments for and against codetermination and survey the empirical evidence on the effects 
of the institution, tracing the three phases of a still sparse literature. Recent findings hold out 
the prospect that good corporate governance might include employee representation by 
virtue of the monitoring function and the reduction in agency costs, while yet cautioning that 
the optimal level of representation is likely below parity. And although the German system 
may be better than its reputation among foreigners, it might have to adapt to globalization and 
the availability of alternative forms of corporate governance in the EU.
JEL classification: J50
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1“’Europeanization’ is likely to encourage new representative structures and processes 
and to create some opportunities for changed outcomes – which may not however be 
grasped” (Hyman, 1997, p. 322).
1. Motivation
Germany is the world’s biggest exporter of goods. One of the few products made in 
Germany   that   has   not   been   exported   successfully   is   the   German   system   of 
codetermination   at   company   level  (Unternehmensmitbestimmung)  with 
representatives of employees sitting on company supervisory boards (sometimes 
called “worker directors”). In contrast to employee representation via works councils 
at   establishment   level  (betriebliche   Mitbestimmung),   which   is   found   in   many 
European countries in various forms and which has also played a role as a template 
in the formulation of legislation on European Works Councils (94/45/EC) in the EU,
1 
Germany has not been able to convince its neighbours or the EU to adopt its system 
of (quasi) parity board-level representation. In short, although there do exist systems 
of board-level employee representation in most EU member states, these are usually 
not as comprehensive as the German system (for a comparative analysis, see Carley, 
1998; Schulten and Zagelmeyer, 1998).
What is more, competition has arisen among the various European systems of 
codetermination   since   the   European   Company   Statute   (Council   Regulation 
2157/2001 and Council Directive 2001/86/EC) adopted by the EU in 2001 gives 
companies the option of forming a European Company (Societas Europaea, SE) 
which may operate on a European-wide basis. Under the legislation, a German 
business establishing an SE can choose between the current two-tier system of 
corporate   governance   in   Germany   (with   its   separation   of   powers   between   a 
management board and a supervisory board) and alternative, one-tier systems 
common in other EU member states (such as the U.K.) where there is a single board 
of directors. In the latter case, companies would not have to adhere to German 
1 Discussions of this form of codetermination and its effects are provided by Addison, Schnabel, and 
Wagner (2004) and Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman (2006). The practice of German codetermination 
at establishment level has also guided a number of other European-level initiatives featuring employee 
participation   or   having   a   participation   component   such   as   Community   legislation   on   collective 
redundancies/mass layoffs (98/59/EC), transfers of undertakings (2001/23/EC), and national systems 
for informing and consulting employees (2002/14/EC), inter al.
2codetermination   laws   (whereas   an   existing   German   public   limited   company 
converting itself into an SE registered in Germany would have to stick to its current 
form of codetermination). Further, in the case of SEs formed via cross-border 
mergers, or the creation of a joint holding company or subsidiary, a fall-back solution 
in the law stipulates that the most extensive form of codetermination should apply to 
the merged company.
2 This too might encourage companies to locate or relocate their 
new headquarters outside Germany.
3 
Despite   the   German   system’s   lack   of   attractiveness   to   other   countries, 
codetermination at company level has held up remarkably well inside Germany. 
According   to   Hans   Böckler   Stiftung,   a   union-sponsored   foundation   monitoring 
codetermination, as of 2006 – some two years after member states had to implement 
the Regulation/Directive (Germany, on this occasion, being two months late in 
complying) – 721 companies were still covered by the German Codetermination Act 
of 1976. This number is slightly down on the maximum of 767 in 2002. Although some 
German companies close to the employment threshold for introduction of (quasi) 
parity-based codetermination have set up SEs with a single board of directors not 
including employee representatives, none of the large public limited companies in 
Germany that have turned themselves into SEs (e.g. Porsche, BASF and Allianz) has 
deviated   from   (quasi)   parity   representation   of   shareholders   and   employee 
representatives.
4
This raises the question of why parity codetermination at company level has 
survived in Germany (and whether it will be able to survive in the future). Have 
companies learned to live with worker directors – as they apparently have with works 
2 Note that these are just two examples of the directive’s potential impact on codetermination. In the 
case of SEs formed through mergers (or via the formation of a holding company or subsidiary), it is 
also possible for an agreement between the special negotiating body and central management to result 
in a lesser degree of board-level participation than the highest proportion that applies within the 
participating companies. All that is required here are the votes of two-thirds of the SNB members 
representing at least two-thirds of the total workforce. This option is not available in the case of a 
company conversion.
3 Such fears are not only voiced by trade unionists in Germany. For the U.K., Hyman (1997, p. 310) 
notes “that regulation at the level of the European Union (EU), while in general modest, may 
encourage the implementation of ‘alien’ representative mechanisms in Britain.”
4  For details and examples, see the foundation’s webpage (http://www.boeckler.de) as well as the 
recent analysis by Keller and Werner (2008). Somewhat in contrast, Stettes (2006) reports that in 2005 
every seventh newly-established private limited company in Germany was registered according to the 
legal form of the U.K., thereby avoiding German codetermination laws.
3councils (see Kotthoff, 1994) – and just fear the hassle of switching to SEs? Or is the 
system simply better than its reputation among foreigners? Since the first of these 
questions is difficult to investigate empirically (because surveying managers is likely 
to result in answers that are deemed to be politically correct), this paper will focus on 
the second question and survey the empirical evidence on the economic effects of 
employee   representation   on   company   supervisory   boards 
(Unternehmensmitbestimmung) in Germany.
5 Our treatment proceeds as follows. We 
first sketch  the  institutional  framework of codetermination  at  company  level  in 
Germany before recounting the theoretical arguments for and against. Next, we 
survey   the  empirical  evidence   on   the   effects  of   the  institution.   Finally,   in   our 
concluding remarks, we draw together the threads of the preceding arguments and 
offer a brief perspective.
2. Institutional Framework
In the German two-tier system of corporate governance, the supervisory board has 
basically four functions (according to the 1965 Stock Corporation Act, Aktiengesetz). 
It   approves   the   appointment   of   management   board   members;   it   monitors   the 
management board (which has to inform it of the broad lines of business policy and 
corporate planning on an annual basis and of business operations on a more regular 
basis);   it   can   codetermine   business   operations   requiring   its   approval;   and   it 
scrutinizes the annual accounts of the company or group.
Various laws and their amendments stipulate that differing shares of seats on 
the supervisory board be allocated to employee representatives, so that there exist 
three different regimes of codetermination at company level in Germany:
 full-parity   codetermination   for   the   coal   and   steel   industries   under   the   1951 
Codetermination Act,
 almost-equal or quasi-parity representation under the 1976 Codetermination Act for 
corporations having more than 2,000 employees (where the chairman of the board, 
elected by the shareholders, has the casting vote in case of a tie),
5 For a survey of the earlier theoretical and empirical literature, see Junkes and Sadowski (1999).
4 one-third representation in companies with between 500 and 2,000 employees 
under the 1952 Works Constitution Act.
The 1951 Act on the Codetermination of Employees in the Supervisory and 
Management Boards of Companies in the Coal, Iron and Steel Industry (or Montan-
Mitbestimmungsgesetz, as it is also known) established supervisory boards ranging in 
size from 11 to 21 members, according to share capital, comprising equal numbers of 
shareholder   and   employee   members   and   one   neutral   member.   Further,   the 
appointment of a Labour Director (who serves on the management board) requires 
the agreement of the employee representatives.
In 1976 under the Codetermination Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz), equal but not 
full-parity representation (hence ‘quasi-parity’ representation) was extended from 
coal, iron and steel to corporations of all other industries where there are as a rule 
more than 2,000 employees. The number of seats on the supervisory board is a 
function of employment: 12 members if the employment total does not exceed 
10,000, 16 if it exceeds 10,000 but is less than 20,000, and 20 where it is greater than 
20,000. Election of the chairman and vice-chairman of the supervisory board in each 
case requires majorities of two-thirds of the votes. If neither gains the necessary 
votes,   the   shareholder   (employee)   representatives   elect   the   chairman   (vice-
chairman). This procedure ensures that the chairman is always a shareholder 
representative and he/she has an extra, tie-breaking vote (unlike the situation in the 
coal, iron and steel  industries). The law also made provision for the inclusion of 
managerial employees, who were given one seat on the supervisory board.
The 1952 Works Constitution Act  (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz)  introduced a 
weaker   form   of   codetermination   by   providing   for   one-third   representation   of 
employees on the supervisory boards of large and medium sized corporations with 
more than 500 employees. The sections of the 1952 Works Constitution Act dealing 
with supervisory board membership in companies with 500 to 2,000 employees were 
amended in the so-called Third Part Act (Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz) of 2004.
6
6  It should be noted that codetermination legislation has generated fierce and ongoing employer 
resistance, and companies (as well as unions) have engaged courts at all levels on codetermination 
issues. For example nine corporations and 29 employers associations challenged the 1976 Act on 
constitutional grounds, as infringing the property rights of shareholders. The Federal Constitutional 
Court in its decision of March 1, 1979, upheld the constitutionality of the law, arguing that shareholder 
rights were protected because the supervisory board chairman still had the casting vote, while noting 
5To summarize, the proportion of worker representatives on company boards 
varies from one-third, in companies with between 500 and 2,000 employees, to one-
half, in companies with more than 2,000 employees. In the latter, the chair in effect 
represents the shareholders and has the casting vote. The exception is the larger 
coal  or  iron  and  steel  companies  where  the  chair  is independent; hence  the 
expression full-parity representation. The number of members of the supervisory 
board is determined either by the share capital or employment of the company or 
group.  The election procedure for employee representatives is complicated and 
varies by type of company and type of codetermination (for details, see Addison, 
2009).
Empirical analyses of the effects of board representation have either exploited 
differences between codetermination and no codetermination or between the various 
types of codetermination. As we shall see, the early literature revealed few effects of 
board   representation   while   the   subsequent   financial   literature   proved   more 
pessimistic. Latterly, with the German national innovation debate, codetermination 
has received modest support from several innovation studies preceded by a panel 
study of productivity. Before reviewing these findings, however, we must first briefly 
discuss some theoretical arguments on (board-level) codetermination.
3. Theoretical remarks
In (continental) European countries, codetermination is usually justified by traditional 
political and social arguments such as the “democratization of the employment 
relationship” and by notions of “stakeholder value”, all of which imply that the interests 
of all relevant groups should be represented in a company’s board. However, even 
economic reasoning focusing on orthodox notions of corporate governance centred 
on “shareholder value” admits of arguments favouring codetermination.
7 The basic 
orthodox economic starting point is that codetermination may be a safeguard for the 
employee side against opportunistic behavior on the part of employers. Absent some 
form   of   protection   (either   institutional   or   contractual),   so   the   argument   runs, 
that the private property rights enshrined in the constitution had also to serve public welfare as might 
obtain from heightened industrial peace and thence improved economic performance.
7 On the two models, see for example Charreaux and Desbrières (2001).
6employees will be unwilling to undertake reliance investments such as firm-specific 
skills acquisition. The upshot is that in circumstances where not all coalition-specific 
resources are owned by one party, codetermination may provide a governance 
structure that is capable of dealing with maximizing agents with conflicting interests 
(Furubotn, 1988, p. 168).
However, the codetermination structure envisaged in this hypothetical joint-
investment firm where the employees are residual claimants is voluntary. By contrast, 
under mandatory codetermination major control rights are ceded to employees 
irrespective of whether or not they have made coalition-specific investments. Further, 
they are given no income rights in the firm, and normally do not share directly in the 
residual, and cannot transfer property rights in the job to others, and so on. Politics, 
so the argument runs, now replace economic responsibility. Employees making 
decisions do not bear the full cost of their decisions. The situation is to be contrasted 
with a proper allocation of property rights in the joint investment firm – a sharing of 
control rights via codetermination – which assures that those making decisions bear 
the full cost of their actions. This incentive structure promotes both productivity-
enhancing incentives as well as relatively lower transaction costs.
Yet, as we all know, such voluntary arrangements have not emerged. Why is 
this? For his part, Furubotn (1988) speculates that this is because employees can 
gain more from the political solution of mandatory codetermination than through 
private bargaining with the firm. After all, they get up to one-half of the seats on the 
supervisory board without any corresponding duty to invest. But the ‘no-show’ result 
has been exploited more generally by Jensen and Meckling (1979), who argue that 
employee board membership must be detrimental to shareholder value because it 
has not been embraced by employers. Indeed, they would see the force feeding and 
strenuous opposition of German employers to parity or quasi-parity codetermination 
as   testimony   to   their   indirect   argument   as   to   the   inefficiency   of   mandatory 
codetermination.
Another explanation could be that the market is systematically biased against 
codetermination. The starting point is the argument by Levine and Tyson (1990) to the 
effect that codetermination will be underprovided by the market on prisoner’s dilemma 
7grounds. The maintained hypothesis is that codetermination is valuable to all firms but 
to sustain it a compressed wage structure and dismissals protection are required. In 
these circumstances, any single innovating firm will suffer an externality and adverse 
selection: its stars will be spirited away by ‘traditional’ firms, who can offer these 
workers higher rewards by virtue of their supposedly sharply differentiated wage 
structures, and it will simultaneously attract the work shy who are now protected from 
dismissal. On both counts, the codetermined firm will not emerge voluntarily and must 
be mandated.
Another line of argument is more compelling because it explicitly recognizes 
rent seeking on the part of labour. Freeman and Lazear (1995) contend that although 
codetermination raises the joint surplus it raises the rent going to labour more. 
Employers duly resist codetermination and it has to be mandated albeit coupled with 
institutional limits on the ability of the employee side to extract rents. The inference of 
the Freeman-Lazear model (which, however, is constructed around  betriebliche 
Mitbestimmung via works councils) is that the allocation of control rights to corporate 
assets may have important implications for economic efficiency but that the absence 
of the institution outside of a mandate is not necessarily decisive.
Thus far we have assumed an identity of interest between management and 
shareholders. What if managers are imperfect agents of the shareholder principal? 
One of the few analyses to exploit such agency considerations is Jirjahn’s (2003) 
treatment of executive incentives and firm performance. Jirjahn’s treatment has a 
basis in two key associations: first, the relationship between codetermination (in his 
model it is works council presence rather than worker representation on company 
boards) and self-enforcing contracts; and, second, the relationship between agency 
problems   and   trustful   employee   relations.   An   agency   problem   may   have   a 
commitment value in making self-enforcing contracts feasible. But the introduction of 
profit sharing for managers may give them the incentive to break implicit contracts 
with   the   employees   on   behalf   of   profit-maximizing   owners   with   adverse 
consequences for trust. Where codetermination and self-enforcing contracts are 
substitutes   (i.e.   the   reputation   effects   mechanism   is   strong),   the   impact   of 
codetermination on firm performance will be stronger in firms with less severe agency 
8problems. Since profit sharing reduces agency problems, the interaction effect 
between codetermination and profit sharing for managers will be positive, and hence 
productive of firm performance. The converse applies where codetermination is 
complementary to self-enforcing contracts (i.e. reducing the employer’s incentive to 
renege on an implicit agreement) and agency increases the range of self-enforcing 
contracts.
Next consider active rent seeking. Such behaviour on the part of management 
decreases the range of feasible self-enforcing contracts by hindering cooperative 
industrial relations. Interaction effects again depend on the relationship between 
codetermination and self-enforcing contracts in building trust. If they are substitutes, 
negative interaction effects are expected because, absent managerial profit sharing, 
codetermination may curb more ambitious rent seeking activities. Any such role for 
codetermination   is   attenuated   where   profit   sharing   provides   an   incentive   for 
management to establish trust. Where codetermination and self-enforcing contracts 
are complementary, on the other hand, the role of codetermination will be more 
effective in firms with profit sharing.
The model is ultimately inconclusive, but it is an interesting application of 
property rights in the context of a contracts model.
8 Although they have largely been 
neglected, property rights considerations would seem to loom large in the area of 
employee board representation. To take just one example, inefficient supervisory 
board structures might dominate diffuse stockholding in circumstances where the 
alternative is labour-controlled boards.
If Jirjahn’s model is firmly set in the framework of betriebliche Mitbestimmung, 
some recent theoretical models have examined board representation more directly in 
bargaining   models.   In   particular,   Kraft   (2001)   considers   a   model   in   which 
shareholders bargain with employee representatives about employment but not 
wages. In situations of oligopoly, Kraft shows that for some range of bargaining power 
8 In fitting a productivity equation to pooled data for 438 German plants observed in 1994 and 1996, 
Jirjahn (2003) reports that both codetermination and executive profit sharing are positively associated 
with value-added per employee, but the interaction term is negative. Accordingly, on this model at any 
rate, either profit-sharing reduces the commitment value of agency in situations where codetermination 
cannot foster trust without the cooperation of management, or management rent seeking is curbed by 
profit sharing and codetermination is not so important in building cooperation in circumstances of 
reduced opportunism on the part of management.
9in this oligopoly model a prisoner's dilemma exists. In short, the firm is better off under 
a codetermination mandate irrespective of whether other firms are subject to the 
mandate, and yet all firms are best off if none of them is subject to codetermination 
(see also Kraft, 1998).
9 Kraft asks whether firms would have an incentive to introduce 
codetermination   voluntarily   (if   they   become   aware   of   the   effects   in   strategic 
interaction). Here he refers to the “many unfortunate aspects of codetermination” in 
terms   of   investment   and   finance   (Kraft,   2001,   p. 563).   He   also   notes   that 
codetermination is unlikely to develop naturally given the restriction of the model that 
bargaining be restricted to employment alone.
A final theoretical development of the codetermined firm in oligopoly is offered 
by Granero (2006), who considers a duopoly model in which one of the firms is 
subject to codetermination while its rival is not. He considers the implication of 
codetermination for R&D and employment. There are two main theoretical results of 
this strategic R&D model. First, in the absence of bargaining but where there is a 
utilitarian management, the output best-response function of the codetermined firm 
shifts out. This can lead the codetermined firm to undertake more R&D investment 
(and more employment) if the degree of codetermination is ‘intermediate.’ Second, 
where there is bargaining – again over employment but not wages which are taken to 
be   exogenous   to   the   firm   –   the   increase   in   R&D   is   unambiguous   because 
employment commitments rule out any secondary reduction in employment resulting 
from the positive effect of R&D on  labour  productivity. As with Kraft (2001), the 
relevance of the model ultimately hinges on the nature-of-bargaining assumption, but 
it   again   serves   to   demonstrate   that   theoretical   guidance   as   to   the   effect   of 
codetermination is not unequivocal.
Finally, since Granero’s model alerts us to certain practicalities such as the 
‘threshold   value’   of   codetermination   (viz.   intermediate   rather   than   high 
codetermination), what other practicalities of German Unternehmensmitbestimmung 
have to be borne in mind? Corporate control rights in the form of votes are valuable 
(e.g. by analogy between voting and non-voting shares) but it is not clear that seats 
9 Kraft (2001) tests his model by focusing on the determinants of the price-cost margin in 22 German 
firms,  1972-1994.   Evidence   compatible   with   codetermined  firms   evincing  different  behaviour  is 
obtained.
10are valuable. Relatedly, and abstracting from the rarity of full-parity representation, 
only almost-equal representation (rather than one-third representation) may affect 
firm performance. Further, rent seeking can take a number of forms: codetermination 
may be used as an inter-temporal insurance vehicle protecting employees from 
adverse shocks and more generally by limiting shareholder’s flexibility. And if the U.S 
union literature (as reviewed by Hirsch, 1991) is applicable, shareholders for their part 
may take countervailing measures. They might increase firm leverage or they might 
even seek to change the remuneration of the supervisory board. It follows from these 
practicalities that investigation of the consequences of company codetermination is a 
multifaceted exercise.
4. The Empirical Evidence
The early literature suggested that codetermination at company level (measured by 
the introduction of the 1951, 1952, and 1976 Acts) had minimal impact on corporate 
performance. As far as  Montanmitbestimmung  is concerned, in comparing two 
industries subject to parity codetermination with the textile industry, Svejnar (1981) 
reported that the introduction of codetermination was associated with significantly 
higher relative earnings in one but not the other. Benelli, Loderer, and Lys (1987) 
report that the variance in annual stock returns in industries subject to full parity 
codetermination was lower than in other industries, 1954-1976, implying that less 
risky investments were being undertaken. But the difference between the two-digit 
industry groups was not statistically significant. Turning to the 1976 Act, Benelli, 
Loderer, and Lys in an examination of monthly portfolio return variances in 40 
codetermined firms over a period before and after passage of the 1976 Act report a 
decline in variance, but the same was true of the control sample of 18 non-
codetermined firms. And average monthly stock returns dipped in both sets of firms 
prior to the passage of the Act. Similarly, analysis of differences in means among 
matched   pairs   of   codetermined   and   non-codetermined   firms   over   an   interval 
preceding and following passage of the legislation indicated no statistically significant 
differences in leverage, profitability, dividend payout, capital intensity, and  labour 
costs. Finally, in an analysis of variance, Gurdon and Rai (1990) found materially 
11higher profitability (but lower productivity) in their sample of codetermined firms post 
1976 than for the control group (of 26 firms).
Each of the above studies has come in for trenchant criticism for reasons that 
include sample size, data frequency (in the case of stock returns), lack of controls for 
other relevant economic or organizational variables, focus on a single event, and 
narrow reach. The second-phase studies that we next examine in more depth attend 
to   some   of   these   criticisms.   They   also   offer   a   more   pessimistic   view   of 
Unternehmensmitbestimmung. That said, in the latest phase the most recent, single-
issue treatments are more upbeat.
The first study identified here is notable for its use of a larger sample of firms 
(but see below) and regression framework. FitzRoy and Kraft (1993) estimate 
translog production functions for a sample of 112 firms using two cross sections of 
data for 1975 and 1983, namely the last year before passage of the 1976 Act and an 
‘equivalent’ (i.e. recession) year sufficiently long after event for the law to have taken 
effect. The analysis hinges on the 68 firms that had over 2,000 employees in both 
years and which therefore changed their codetermination status from one-third to 
quasi-party   codetermination.   In   each   cross   section,   the   dummy   variable   COD 
identifies firms with 2,000 or more employees, so that the change in the point 
estimate identifies the effect of the change in the law.
10
The authors run three sets of regressions for each cross section: value added, 
total labour cost per employee, and return on equity. In a final regression, they 
consider   the   determinants   of   productivity   growth,   1975-83.   The   value-added 
regressions record a significant coefficient estimate for 1973 and an insignificantly 
negative   coefficient   estimate   for   1983.   The   difference   between   coefficients   is 
statistically significant at the .10 level. That said, the labour cost regressions do not 
suggest that wages increased, even though the COD coefficient estimates were 
significantly positive in both years. Yet return on equity did decline significantly over 
the two years, while the total factor productivity equation indicated that the move to 
quasi-parity codetermination was associated with a reduction in growth. This was the 
10 Note that the omitted category consists of publicly-traded companies (because of the need to obtain 
financial information) but since these are necessarily non-codetermined they are not typical of the 
firmament of such companies.
12first study to suggest that the shift to quasi-parity codetermination after 1976 might 
have measurable private costs: a productivity loss of just under 20 percent of value 
added. Yet the rent seeking mechanism does not appear to be wages but rather 
“increased job security and immobility” (FitzRoy and Kraft, 1993, p. 374).
Results consistent with those found by FitzRoy and Kraft are reported by 
Schmid and Seger (1998) in a German-language study of a sample of 160 large 
publicly-traded companies observed in 1976, 1987, and 1991. (We will abstract from 
that part of the authors’ study dealing with voting blocks in company meetings and 
revisit this issue below in the final analysis considered here.) The dependent variable 
in this regression study is the market-to-book ratio of equity and the comparison 
group is again firms with one-third employee representation. Unlike FitzRoy and Kraft 
(1993), however, this study does not contrast the performance of a given firm before 
and after the passage of legislation but instead pools the observations and uses year 
dummies   and   control   variables   specific   to   the   firm   to   net   out   the   effects   of 
codetermination. (We note that this approach and the unbalanced number of firms in 
the various years is heavily criticized by Junkes and Sadowski, 1999). The coefficient 
estimate for COD implies an 18 percent decline in share prices. As the authors put it, 
shareholders would have been willing to cede around 22 percent of the current value 
of their pre-legislation investment to cancel that legislation, where this ‘willingness to 
pay’ is the market price of the loss of control rights experienced by shareholders.
The next study examined here by Baums and Frick (1998) is an events study 
using daily stock return data whose findings are more in line with the earlier literature. 
It examines over a period of more than twenty years (January 1, 1974 – December 
31, 1995) the outcome of 23 court decisions concerning application of the 1976 Act, 
either extending or restricting codetermination. (The cases in question were either 
litigated by the relevant industrial union or by firms seeking to reject the union’s 
claims.) In other words, the sample arguably identifies those cases most likely to 
suffer material loss as a result of passage of the 1976 Act. Familiarly, the authors 
compute abnormal returns and the sum of abnormal returns (or cumulated abnormal 
returns) for the 28 firms in question.
11 The authors consider the abnormal returns on 
11 28 firms rather than 23 because in one case 6 companies lodged a joint appeal to the Federal 
Constitutional Court.
13the event days – the date the judicial decision was issued – as well as cumulated 
abnormal returns in the ten days before and after the event (plus a variety of longer 
event windows), and also present regression estimates inter alia of the contribution of 
the type of decision reached (extension/restriction), the outcome (firm wins, union 
wins, or neither wins), the type of court involved (court of first instance, Appellate 
Court, Federal Civil Court, Federal Constitutional Court) and reach or ambit of the 
decision (affecting the firm only or having an economy-wide impact).
Baums and Frick (1998) report that abnormal returns on the event day were 
modestly positive and were larger (smaller) where there was an extension (restriction) 
of codetermination rights, although in neither case were these changes statistically 
significant.   Cumulated   abnormal   returns   evinced   no   pattern,   and   were   not 
systematically related to type of decision. Nor for that matter did company success (or 
failure) lead to an increase (decrease) in abnormal returns on either the event day or 
thereafter. Turning to the authors’ regression analysis, in no case were the structural 
characteristics   of   the   court   decision   statistically   significant   determinants  of   the 
abnormal return or the cumulated abnormal return.
This issue of ‘employer friendly’ and ‘employee friendly’ legal decisions offers 
an interesting approach to investigating the consequences of codetermination. The 
fact that the authors were unable to find statistically significant stock market reactions 
to the verdicts, one way or another, is intriguing. The authors do, however, offer two 
possible reasons for their finding that stockholders did not experience financial losses 
due to legal decisions that extended codetermination rights. First a technical reason: 
the judgment dates used did not correspond to the (unobserved in this study) 
announcement dates on which information about the disputes or lawsuits was 
disseminated in the press. In short, the results may have been an artifact of the data, 
hiding real losses of stockholders. Second, the judicial decisions observed may not 
have been that important. More important in this respect perhaps were the dates 
corresponding to the introduction of the Act (July 1, 1976) and the ruling of the 
Federal Constitutional Court that the Act was constitutional (March 1, 1979). Acting 
against this latter interpretation, however, is the authors’ separate sectoral analysis 
that fails generally to detect negative (positive) changes in average abnormal returns 
14in the sectors most (least) impacted by the Act, comparing the two-and-one-half year 
period prior to the introduction of the Act/declaration of its constitutionality and the ten 
days thereafter.
The most detailed study to date of the effects of codetermination on firm 
financial   performance   by   Gorton   and   Schmid   (2004)   reaches   more   concrete 
conclusions and provides results more in keeping with the U.S. union literature (e.g. 
Hirsch, 1991, chapter 4) other than in one important respect. The authors examine 
the consequences of codetermination for the largest 250 non-financial traded stock 
corporations in Germany using pooled cross-section time-series data for the sample 
period 1989-1993. They consider in turn whether quasi-parity codetermination (as 
compared with one-third representation) affects the performance of the firm – and the 
manner   of   that   influence   –   and   whether,   as   reported   in   the   U.S.   literature, 
shareholders responded by taking countervailing measures (such as the assumption 
of increased debt) to offset the influence of the employee board members.
The authors pay especial attention to the ownership structure of the German 
corporation   and   to   the   monitoring   function.   Some   relevant   distinguishing 
characteristics of the German governance system to keep in mind here are the 
importance of block share holding, and the role of the banks in controlling equity and 
corporate governance. Also relevant is the composition of the supervisory board 
where   one-third   of   shareholder   representatives   have   no   equity   interest   in   the 
company and where the labour side consists of several groups (of workers who are 
not affiliated with unions or works councils, of union representatives, and of middle 
management). Finally, as far as ownership structure is concerned, the German 
situation is complicated because of pyramiding and cross-shareholding. This brings 
about a distinction between cash flow rights and control rights. In their study, Gorton 
and Schmid thus use the notion of ‘ultimate ownership.’ And ultimate ownership 
emerges as highly concentrated. In their estimating equations, the authors control for 
the equity control rights held by three types of (ultimate) owners that have been found 
in the literature to affect the stock market performance of the firm: government, 
banks, and insiders. They also control for shareholder concentration through the size 
of the largest existing stake of equity control rights, using a categorical variable.
15In analyzing the effect of codetermination on the economic performance of the 
firm, Gorton and Schmid (2004) use two forward-looking financial indicators: the 
market-to-book ratio of equity (MTB) and Tobin’s q (i.e. the market value of the firm 
divided by the replacement cost of assets). But they range much further afield and 
also examine the effects of codetermination on company leverage, the wage bill-to-
employees   ratio,   the   employee-to-sales   ratio,   and   the   compensation   of   the 
management board and the supervisory board.
Beginning with financial performance, their econometric estimation proceeds 
using a regression discontinuity approach. Familiarly, the principal codetermination 
regressor picks up the effect of quasi-parity representation as opposed to one-third 
representation.   The   authors   present   semi-parametric   regression   estimates   for 
(logarithmic) MTB for each of the five years 1989-1993. In each case, the coefficient 
estimate for COD is negative and statistically significant. The stock market discount 
ranges from 21 percent in 1989 to 43 percent in 1992, averaging 31 percent over the 
period. In short, going from one-third to almost-equal worker representation appears 
to have very serious consequences for shareholder wealth, providing a backdrop to 
the   strong   opposition   of   German   employers   to   the   1976   legislation   noted   in 
section 2.
12 Gorton and Schmid then check the robustness of their main results. They 
first reestimate the regression discontinuity model substituting Tobin’s q for MTB and 
then deploy a nearest-neighbour approach using both performance indicators. Use of 
Tobin’s q yields a narrow spread of statistically significant negative effects of quasi-
parity codetermination in the range 24 percent to 29 percent, and averaging 26 
percent in the period 1989-1993. Use of a nearest-neighbour (peer group or single 
firm) approach yields a smaller discount in the range of 9 to 15 percent.
13
The balance of the authors’ analysis is given over to investigating whether 
codetermination alters the objective function of the firm and possible shareholder 
12 Interestingly, the second most important influence on this profit measure is the fraction of control 
rights exercised by the government! A one percentage point increase in this fraction decreases the 
stock market valuation of the firm by between 0.26 and 0.41 percent. The effect of insiders on 
performance is generally positive in that the greater the equity control rights held by management, 
other employees, and families, the better financial performance. The influence of the other regressors 
is mixed.
13  When one-third representation is compared with almost-equal representation, the stock market 
premium is correspondingly higher, in the range of 38 to 67 percent.
16countermeasures. In seeking an answer to the former question, Gorton and Schmid 
(2004) examine the effects of board representation on managerial compensation and 
find that average management board compensation is contemporaneously negatively 
linked to performance (measured by MTB) in quasi-parity codetermined firms, and 
conversely for their counterparts with one-third employee board membership. As far 
as labour’s objectives are concerned, the authors’ regression discontinuity estimates 
point to an absence of any effect of codetermination on the ratio of the (log) wage bill 
to the number of employees. This result is attributed by the authors to a wage 
determination process that is conducted outside the firm at industry or regional level. 
But if codetermination has no measurable impact on earnings, material effects are 
reported for employment, alternatively measured by the (log) ratio of employees to 
sales and the (log) ratio of the wage bill to sales. Averaged over each of the five years 
in the sample period, codetermination is associated with a 48 percent longer payroll 
and a 55 percent higher payroll. The obvious implication is that codetermination 
results in overstaffing and success by the employee side in altering the objective 
function of the firm.
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In the final part of their analysis, Gorton and Schmid examine whether 
shareholders take countermeasures that limit – presumably at some cost – worker 
appropriation of the firm’s surplus. Using their nearest-neighbours  approach, they 
report that shareholders respond to quasi-parity representation by increasing the 
performance sensitivity of supervisory board compensation. That is to say, the pay of 
non-executive directors is more sensitive to firm performance when employees have 
quasi-parity board representation than when one-third of the board is made up of 
worker representatives. In the spirit of the U.S. union literature, the authors also test 
whether   leverage   is   higher   under   quasi-parity   representation.   Their   regression 
discontinuity regressions indicate that the effect of equal representation is to increase 
the debt-equity ratio by between 47 and 81 percent over the sample period, or by 69 
percent on average. Accordingly, Gorton and Schmid (2004, p. 895) conclude: 
“Shareholders attempt to align with shareholder wealth the interests of employer 
14 But we should note that Gorton and Schmid (2004, p. 890) caution that “codetermination-induced 
productivity effects cannot be ruled out.”
17representatives on the supervisory board by linking employer compensation to firm 
performance and by leveraging up the firm.”
Although Gorton and Schmid’s study has received some criticism by reason of 
its cross-section methodology (where firm specific effects and survivor effects cannot 
be controlled for), note that the authors are able to distinguish between the influence 
of (quasi) equal representation and firm size. Their identification strategy hinges on 
the regression discontinuity introduced by the binary nature of the codetermination 
variable. Specifically, equal representation is a discontinuous function of firm size (the 
number of employees of the group of affiliated firms) and firm size (measured by 
stock   market   capitalization)   is   assumed   to   have   a   continuous   effect   on   firm 
performance. In the authors’ semi-parametric model, firm size is included in the 
nonparametric   component   and   the   binary   codetermination   variable   is   in   the 
parametric component. The goal is to purge the data of the influence of firm size prior 
to estimating the influence of equal representation in the third step (Gorton and 
Schmid, 2004, Appendix C). In short, their results do not appear to confound the 
effect of this type of codetermination with a size effect, subject to the caveat that their 
sample is restricted to only the largest firms (that is, they do not consider firms with 
less than one-third employee board representation – on the possible consequences 
of which see below).
Summarizing the literature up to this point, we might argue that the anodyne 
results from the widely-criticized early studies have given way to improved estimates 
that   tend   to   paint   a   much   bleaker   picture   of   the   economic   consequences   of 
codetermination at board level. But, as is so often the case with studies of German 
institutions, a revisionist interpretation is actively under way.
In the first place, FitzRoy and Kraft (2005) have revised their earlier finding that 
the 1976 Act adversely impacted labour productivity (although they do not investigate 
whether the same holds true for firm profitability and the other indicators examined in 
their 1993 study). The authors now seek to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity 
or firm-specific effects, necessarily neglected in their earlier cross-section study. 
Using panel data for 179 manufacturing firms from 1972-1976 and 1981-1985 (i.e. 
pre- and post-1976 panels), they regress (log) sales on a codetermination dummy 
18defined as firm size greater than or equal to 2,000 in both panels and an additional 
codetermination dummy defined as codetermined firms only after 1980. The latter 
variable   thus   picks   up   the   effect   of   moving   form   one-third   to   quasi-parity 
codetermination, while the former variable is designed to control for any possible size 
effect present in the 2,000 employee limit.  Other regressors are labour, capital, 
material inputs, overtime hours, concentration, and imports and exports. Since 
conventional firm-fixed effects cannot be distinguished from codetermination effects, 
the authors proceed by allowing some of the other explanatory variables to be related 
to firm-specific effects and others not, using the Hausman-Taylor method in which 
both   codetermination   variables   are   instrumented.   The   authors’   Cobb-Douglas 
production function estimates suggest that the switch from one-third to quasi-parity 
codetermination   raised   productivity   by   less   than   one   percent.   An   alternative 
specification also allowing for the effect of one-third representation prior to 1976, 
defined as firms with more than 500 but less than 2,000 employees, produced similar 
results for the change to almost equal parity representation (although the omitted 
category  now comprises very much smaller  firms than before) and a positive 
coefficient estimate for the new codetermination dummy (subject of course to the 
caveat than no before-and-after test is employed here). On net, the authors conclude 
that they can now reject the view that the 1976 Act had effects that were primarily 
redistributional.
Kraft and Ugarković (2006) basically repeat the exercise for the ‘missing 
dependent variable’: the rate of return on equity. That is, their estimations use panel 
data for 179 companies from 1971 to 1976 and from 1981 to 1986 applying the 
Hausman-Taylor approach. The regressors include a quadratic in establishment size, 
capital intensity, market share, the six-firm concentration ratio, export and import 
shares,   extent   of   overtime   working,   and   three   age   dummies   –   and,   in   one 
specification by way of a robustness check, a dummy variable for those firms with 
one-third employee board representation throughout (although this does not allow 
them to recoup a before-and-after outcome for this lesser-codetermination argument). 
The authors’ results suggest that the additional effect of the introduction of parity 
codetermination to the initial difference between potential parity codetermination firms 
19and the rest was a small positive value, implying a modestly favourable impact on the 
return on equity of the 1976 strengthening in the codetermination law.
Analysts thus far have neglected the issue of investment which is the missing 
link in the study of codetermination and allocative efficiency. With the national 
innovation debate in Germany (see Nationales Reformprogramm Deutschland, 2005), 
however, the role of company boards in influencing intangible capital has attracted 
some scrutiny. To date there have been just two innovation studies, both using 
patents as the output indicator and building on theoretical models of strategic R&D 
introduced in section 3 (using the symmetric bargaining case). Kraft, Stank and 
Dewenter (2003), in an analysis of patent data for 1971 to 1990 covering 162 stock 
companies (62 of which were codetermined after 1976), report evidence of modestly 
higher R&D activity (circa 4 percent) among codetermined firms. And a similar 
conclusion is reached by Kraft and Stank (2004).
But we lack studies of investment. Even if none of the studies reviewed here 
has obtained evidence of higher wages under quasi-parity codetermination, several 
have pointed to lower profitability which may adversely impact investment in imperfect 
capital markets. In the interstices, it is also worth noting here that although patents 
might be expected to exhibit a relationship with codetermination largely similar to that 
obtaining in the case of R&D inputs, codetermined companies may patent, given their 
innovation capital, as a means of reducing rent appropriation. As pointed out in the 
U.S. union literature, patents offer the opportunity for firms to license product and 
process innovations, to transform what might otherwise be firm-specific innovative 
capital into general capital and thereby lessen any ability on the part of the employee 
side on the supervisory board to appropriate the quasi-rents from that capital (see 
Hirsch, 2004).
We conclude this review with two recent further studies: one by Renaud (2007) 
that is very much in the spirit of FitzRoy and Kraft (2005) and Kraft and Ugarković 
(2006); and the other by Fauver and Fuerst (2006) that is a companion study to 
Gorton and Schmid (2004). We begin with Renaud’s analysis of 250-500 companies 
from the German Financial Database, 1970-2000, which uses the dummies COD and 
COD80 and the Hausman-Taylor (1981) approach. Renaud (2007) provides three 
20sets of regressions. The first offers a difference-in-differences analysis of value added 
and profits in which 1970-1976 is the pre-treatment period and 1980-2000 is the post-
treatment period. The second seeks to determine the effects of parity codetermination 
over time using differences in the trends of productivity and profits in quasi-parity 
codetermined firms and the rest of the sample with one-third employee board 
representation. The third is a changing parameters model combining elements of the 
two former approaches. The regressors in the productivity model in addition to the 
two codetermination variables are employment, capital, age dummies, unit labour 
costs, and time and industry dummies. The price equation adds capital intensity and 
the debt ratio as regressors.
The results are as follows. The basic difference-in-differences regression 
points to mixed coefficients estimates for COD but positive and statistically significant 
estimates for COD80, indicating that the introduction of near-parity codetermination 
increased both productivity and profitability in the affected companies in the wake of 
the 1976 law.
15 The trend estimates of productivity and profitability are mixed. Thus, 
there is no suggestion of any differential productivity growth favouring quasi-parity 
codetermined firms after 1980 or indeed any initial differences between the two sets 
of firms. For profitability, the initial difference is actually negative and statistically 
significant but the trend interaction terms indicate that the profitability situation for 
quasi-parity codetermined firms improved after 1980 relative to the control group. As 
far as the evolution of the trend is concerned, the author obtains no differential effects 
in any year after 1980 for productivity while in the case of profitability just one 
interaction term (for the most recent year) is positive and well determined. For both 
trend analyses, Renaud (2007) cautions that any observed trend differences between 
the two groups of firms might result from other unobserved influences on the two 
outcome   indicators   not   captured   by   the   specification.   So   perhaps   the   most 
reasonable conclusion from this study is that codetermined companies did not suffer 
from the 1976 law.
This brings us in conclusion to the important study by Fauver and Fuerst 
(2006) in which it is argued that  prudent levels of employee representation  on 
15 Although, as the author admits, the implied increases in productivity and profits – at 16.8 percent and 
DM 60.5 million, respectively – seem “pretty high intuitively” (Renaud, 2007, fn. 22).
21company boards can improve board-level decision-making. It is further argued that 
the potential payoff can be expected to be greater in industries requiring more intense 
coordination and information-sharing activities, and that the presence of labour 
representatives can enhance the monitoring of managers and thereby reduce shirking 
activities.   No   such   favourable   inferences   are   drawn   with   respect   to   union 
representation on company boards.
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Fauver and Fuerst (2006) examine a larger sample of firms than Gorton and 
Schmid (2004), including firms without any employee board representation, albeit for 
2003 alone. The sample consists of all publicly-held firms traded on the German stock 
exchange at that time (n = 786). The authors present a series of cross-sectional 
regressions using Tobin’s q, supplemented with logit regressions of dividend payment 
inter al. In addition to the key labour representation measure – namely the presence 
of one or more employee board level representatives – the covariates include firm 
size, business segment, geographic diversification, ownership concentration, bank 
board members, industry concentration, leverage (total debt divided by total assets), 
and several interaction terms.
In the initial regressions, the key employee representation indicator has no 
effect on firm value as measured by Tobin’s  q. However, when interacted with 
industries supposedly requiring greater coordination, labour involvement and more 
specialized   employee   skills   sets   (together  process   complexity)   the   coefficient 
estimate for the interaction term is positive and statistically significant  throughout. 
Voluntary representation, captured by a variable that takes the value of one where the 
number of employee representatives exceeds the legal limits, always has a positive 
influence on shareholder value. By the same token, union representation is uniformly 
insignificant.
17  As   far   as   ownership   concentration,   industrial   diversification   and 
16 For an interesting German-language study using data for 2002 and 2003 which reports a significantly 
negative effect on employment of trade union representatives on company boards, see Werner and 
Zimmermann (2005).
17 Logit results are also provided for dividend payouts (circumstances where the firm pays a dividend 
=1, 0 otherwise). Firms are significantly more likely to pay dividends when there are employee 
representatives on the board and the interaction of employee representation with the operating income 
to sales ratio is also positive, which Fauver and Fuerst (2006) take to suggest that labour facilitates the 
payment of a cash dividend and mitigates appropriation by insiders and large shareholders. In short, 
employee representatives bring to the table a knowledge base that complements that of shareholder 
representatives.
22industrial concentration are concerned, employee representation offsets negative 
effects and amplifies positive effects on shareholder value. For example, employee 
board members appear to monitor and reduce the appropriation of small shareholders 
by powerful blockholders who would otherwise govern the firm to maximize their own 
private benefit.
Returning to the point that industries requiring more intense coordination, 
integration of activities, and information sharing benefit more from codetermination, 
there is some indication that employee representation that ‘weakly exceeds one-third 
but is strictly less than 50 percent’ in interaction with these industry indicators (e.g. 
trade, manufacturing and transportation) evinces a positive and statistically significant 
effect on firm value while all other employee representation levels are statistically 
insignificant.   So   Fauver   and   Fuerst   (2006)   speak   of   some   optimal   level   of 
representation.
Finally,   and   abstracting   here   from   some   important   governance   issues 
(including managerial agency costs) because of space constraints, the authors claim 
they are able to reproduce Gorton and Schmid’s (2004) results when they restrict the 
sample to the top 250 companies and use these authors’ measure of employee 
representation   (i.e.   quasi-parity   representation   =   1,   0   otherwise)   and   controls. 
Accordingly, Fauver and Fuerst (2006) conclude that the difference between the two 
studies is due to (a) sample size considerations, (b) the greater likelihood of union 
representatives as opposed to true employees being on company boards in the 
Gorton-Schmid sample, and (c) the interaction of complex and high coordination 
industries and employee board representation neglected by Gorton and Schmid.
5. Conclusions
Worker representation on company boards arouses strong feelings. At one extreme it 
is viewed as tantamount to wealth confiscation (e.g. Alchian, 1984, p. 46) with 
palpably adverse consequences for firm performance. At another, it is viewed as 
helping guarantee cooperative  labour  relations, with long-term gains in terms of 
productivity and improved worker morale. Intermediate positions would recognize the 
joint occurrence of allocative and distributive effects, permitting either increases or 
23decreases in overall welfare (according to the position taken on the ability of the 
German system to mediate the conflict between the two forces).
The official German position would appear to be that codetermination is an 
essential and indispensable element of the social market economy. However, a recent 
high-level government commission charged with producing proposals on how to 
adapt quasi-parity codetermination to changed economic and social conditions could 
not agree on a fundamental revision of codetermination.
18  Opinions  of the main 
interest groups in Germany are sharply divided on the efficacy of quasi-parity 
codetermination.   Although   unions   argue   that   codetermination   is   a   successful 
cornerstone of the German model, the employer organizations seek a ratcheting back 
to one-third codetermination as a default position. They point to a report issued by the 
Cologne Institute for Economic Research (Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln) 
covering approximately 200 private limited companies which concluded that parity 
codetermination was a source of locational disadvantage. For example, roughly one-
half   of   establishments   with   (quasi)   parity   representation   indicated   that   the 
participation of employee representatives slowed the decision making process. The 
perceptions of firms with one-third employee representation were altogether more 
positive, even if a majority of both sets of companies reacted negatively to the 
participation of external union representatives. And overall, more than 40 percent of 
all companies surveyed viewed mandatory codetermination as either a great or a 
slight obstacle to attracting investment and to mergers with German or foreign 
companies (for details, see Vogel, 2007).
18 More precisely, since the tripartite Biedenkopf Commission was unable to reach consensus, the 
three academics on the nine-member committee published their own report. This stated that “…the 
academic members see no overall reason to place in doubt the positive forecast of the legislation of 
1976, and to propose a fundamental revision of the legislation, let alone its repeal”, concluding that 
codetermination at company level had strengthened the motivation and sense of responsibility of 
workers and fostered social harmony (Hans Böckler Stiftung, 2007, p. 3). One main recommendation 
was that existing legislation be made simpler and more flexible on the basis of negotiations between 
the two sides, proposing that the worker side encompass representatives of the works council, the 
union, and senior management according to their composition on the relevant board and that decisions 
be reached on the basis of a three-quarters majority. The other main recommendation was that the 
patchwork   of   inconsistent   requirements   of   the   existing   legislation   (e.g.   the   differing   reporting 
responsibilities of the management board to the supervisory board by type of company) be rendered 
consistent.
24The   union   side   has   reacted   forcefully,   buttressing   its   advocacy   of   a 
strengthening of codetermination (via a reduction in the 1976 Act’s employment size 
threshold) with  favourable commentary as to the impact of the status quo ante 
contained in selected academic studies (including, for example, the commissioned 
study by Vitols, 2006). It has also pointed to commissioned survey results according 
to which 74 percent of the German public view codetermination as a locational 
advantage and 82 percent of respondents favour  the status quo as regards the 
codetermination rights of employees in supervisory boards (Hans Böckler Stiftung, 
2004).
Against this background we have considered the arguments for and against 
employee representation on the supervisory board. Theory offers guidance but does 
not allow an unequivocal position to be taken on the issue, absent very stringent 
assumptions. As usual, therefore, we were led to consider the empirical evidence, 
tracing three phases in a still sparse literature. The first, comprising a mix of event 
studies and non-parametric analyses, failed to detect any systematic effect of board 
codetermination on firm performance. The widely recognized limitations of this 
research led to a second-phase literature comprising econometric studies and events 
analyses containing controls lacking in the earlier literature and richer stock market 
data. Although the evidence from this second phase is not uniform, the balance of the 
evidence suggests that codetermination is associated with lower productivity, lower 
profits, a lower market-to-book ratio of equity (and q-ratio), higher labour costs (if not 
wages), longer payrolls, and some suggestion of shareholder countermeasures. 
Finally, the most recent literature provides several reversals of finding and several 
new   results.   First,   there   is   the   suggestion   that   the   negative   productivity   and 
profitability effects observed in the second-phase literature may be artifacts of cross-
section estimation. Second, there is the suggestion that innovation as measured by 
patents may be modestly higher in codetermination regimes. Both are interesting 
findings   even   if   the   innovation   result   may   not   be   particularly   compelling   until 
supported by similar evidence on R&D  inputs. But most intriguing of all are the 
findings of the two modern financial studies of the market value of the firm. They hold 
out   the   prospect   that   good   corporate   governance   might   include   employee 
25representation by virtue of the monitoring function and the reduction in agency 
costs.
19 But equally, they raise some very important caveats such as the extent of 
labour representation and the role of external, union representatives, suggesting that 
optimal representation may be below parity and should be restricted to internal 
representatives. The latter research is arguably the more fundamental and should 
inform the more conventional econometric studies more than it has to date.
This, then, is the current state of play in the board-level codetermination 
literature. Further progress in this area would seem to await more detailed analysis of 
German corporate governance, tantalizing glimpses into which are offered by both the 
theory and the most detailed of the extant financial studies. And at some stage 
investigation of the interaction between board membership and works councils needs 
to be attempted, which is not an easy assignment given the size thresholds of even 
one-third employee representation and the strong direct association between works 
council presence and establishment size. Finally, researchers should try to examine a 
more comprehensive set of outcome indicators while recognizing the limitations of the 
data.
Despite the research limitations and desiderata mentioned above, a tentative 
conclusion from our reading of the empirical literature would be that – at least in the 
past – the German system of codetermination at company level has not had (positive 
or negative) economic effects of a magnitude that would induce (other) companies 
(and governments) to adopt the system or to wholly abandon it. Although there are 
some   indications   that   German   companies   have   tried   to   avoid   or   circumvent 
codetermination,
20  most companies seem to have learned to live with it. A recent 
survey concludes that even the establishment of the European Company (SE) 
offering alternative forms of corporate governance without parity representation does 
19 See also the findings of a survey among representatives of the group of executive managers on the 
supervisory board by Jürgens and Lippert (2005), which suggest that all groups on the supervisory 
board contribute specific areas of knowledge and that each of these groups may be indispensable.
20 There is anecdotal evidence that some companies in Germany have stopped growing or split up 
before crossing the threshold levels of employment at which quasi-parity codetermination starts or that 
they scaled down the employment size of their operations. Unfortunately, empirical investigation of 
such cases is lacking. But in a recent study with a bearing on the strictures of codetermination at 
establishment level (i.e. the works council machinery), Koller, Schnabel and Wagner (2008) do not find 
any evidence that the obligation to release works councillors from work above certain employment 
thresholds has affected the employment dynamics of German establishments.
26not seem to have changed this: “At least for the time being there is no trend towards 
‘escape from codetermination’ or its ‘erosion’, as is feared by (quite a few) trade 
unionists”   (Keller   and   Werner,   2008,   p. 169).   Taken   together,   these   pieces   of 
evidence suggest that the German system of codetermination may simply be better 
than its reputation abroad.
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That said, it is assuredly still an open question as to whether and how the 
German system will adapt to the process of globalization and the availability of 
alternative forms of corporate governance in the European Union. The observation 
that German employer organizations have intensified their lobbying activities against 
parity representation in recent years (favouring one-third representation instead) may 
be a reflection of intensified world-wide competition on goods markets as well as of 
EU-wide competition in systems of codetermination. It also ties in with the insights of 
the recent study by Fauver and Fuerst (2006) that employee representation which is 
below 50 percent may be better for firm value. Even abstracting from employer 
efforts, the German system may have to undergo some changes because the decline 
in union density and works council coverage alike means that new institutions might 
have to arise even to meet EU directives on measures to inform and consult 
employees.
As a sort of litmus test of codetermination, it will be interesting to see whether 
codetermined companies in Germany will be as flexible and successful in adapting to 
the challenges of globalization and of the current economic crisis as companies 
without quasi parity board-level representation. If they do more than cope, Germany 
may not only retain its status as one of the world’s leading exporters but might also be 
more successful in exporting its system of company-level codetermination.
21 Note that in the survey by the Cologne Institute for Economic Research mentioned above almost 
equal shares of establishments with parity representation according to the 1976 Codetermination Act 
judged codetermination positively or negatively (34.2 and 37.8 percent, respectively). Among firms 
falling within the ambit of one-third representation, the acceptance rate was even higher (56.5 percent); 
see Vogel (2007).
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